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Subject: RE: Security protocols for TRP
Bob, Excellent. Because, now we have a three way synergy - BP, TRP, RegRep and some tracability between the groups' specifications. I will comb thru the BP archives and wait for the BP document on the winter solstice ! cheers > -----Original Message----- > From: Bob Haugen [mailto:linkage@interaccess.com] > Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2000 6:06 PM > To: 'Krishna Sankar' > Cc: ebxml-ta-security@lists.ebxml.org; ebxml-regrep@lists.ebxml.org > Subject: RE: Security protocols for TRP > > > Krishna, > > Many of the excellent issues you raise below have been addressed > in the BP "specification schema" developed in Boston last week. > (Note: "addressed" here does not mean full technical details, > which are the province of other groups, but more on the level > of parameters for runtime software.) > > Some early documents are available on the BP mailing list archives. > Consolidated and agreed ones are due December 22. This schema > is for B2B transactions, but would probably work for regrep interactions > as well. I'm not saying the schema will solve all your problems, > just that it will be worth looking at. > > Some answers from the schema: > > > 1. Will the layers above the TRP (e.g.. Application > layer) know that the > >(received) message was signed and encrypted ? > > Yes. > > > 2. On the flip side, I assume the layers above can > specify the requirement > >for encryption and signature when sending a message. > > Yes. > > > 3. The major question is, at the receiving end, have > the application layers > >access to the certificate and other artifacts used in the MSH level > >encryption and signature ? > > If you so specify. > > > 4. Also, how does the MSH know who is "acceptable" and who is > >"unacceptable" ? It can know whether the signature passed or failed > >(including expired certs) - but anything else is at the > application layer, > >which is not accesible to the MSH. > > Correct. > > > 5. On the question of non-repudiation, does the MSH > perform the persistence > >or is it a function of the application ? Thinking this thru, if > the app has > >to do the (non-repudiation related) persistence, it also needs to get the > >message as received and also the decrypted message. Am I making sense ? > > There will need to be more of a protocol stack than MSH<->Application. > A business document can be encrypted before it reaches the MSH, > and decrypted after on the other end. For full discussion of repudiation, > see next answer. > > > 6. The next one is, how does non-repudiation happen on > the sending side ? > > I'm going to duck this one. There was a complicated discussion of > this issue in Boston, > and I am not sure of the full resolution, but it will be > addressed at some level > in the Dec 22 documents. > > Hope this helps rather than confuses, > Bob Haugen > >
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