So far
we have had a very lively discussion regarding satisfaction of the security
requirements for the Message Servicing Specification. Based on the discussions the following
items were agreed.
1.
Payload
security is not the responsibility of the MSH. The function may be performed on a B2B
server that also hosts the MSH; however the MSH does not own the
operations. There was agreement
that the MSH would not alter the payload.
2.
Applications
should be able to sign payloads using S/MIME, PGP/MIME, or XML-DSig. The POC will be asked to ensure that
signed payloads can be reliably communicated between MSH
agents.
3.
Applications
should provide confidentiality using S/MIME or PGP/MIME. The POC will be asked to ensure that
encrypted payloads can be reliably communicated between MSH
agents.
4.
The
MSH must support the signing of an entire ebXML document. There are two alternatives on the
table—one using XML/DSig another using S/MIME. These two proposals impact the current
version of the MSH specification (0.8).
The XML/DSig solution will allow us to use the ebXML header, as it is
currently defined. The S/MIME
signing does inject difficulties, especially where they involve multiple
signatures or message routing.
5.
The
MSH must support selective encryption of data within the ebXML header. It was agreed that this requirement
could not be satisfied in phase 1,2, or 3. It was suggested that S/MIME be used to
satisfy this requirement—that will require significant restructuring of the
ebXML Header. It was also
suggested that we wait and employ XML-encryption once that standard becomes
available. Assuming that the
XML-encryption work takes a form similar to the XML/DSig product, we should be
able to use the XML-encryption standard with the current structure of the
ebXML header.
Chris
and Maryann are pleading for a teleconference to discuss points 4 and 5. The
major question is whether the group is prepared to restructure the ebXML
document header to support the broad security requirement (as they apply to
the entire ebXML document). It is
important that TRP think about the proposals that are going to come from the
security group and that they are prepared to discuss them during the
face-to-face scheduled for January (London). Formal notification of this
request will be coming directly from Maryann, the chairperson of the Security
Work Group.