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Subject: ebXML Security & W3C Ongoing work
Hi team, I've been doing some research on XML security, and came across a W3C Working Draft entitled "XML-Signature Core Syntax and Processing" whose URL is: http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/WD-xmldsig-core-20000104 This document would seem to be a good substitute for the X12 and UN/EDIFACT Security capability embodied in the security envelopes of X12.56 and IISO 9735 (-6, I believe) I was impressed with the overall capabilities defined, especially in the ability to control what is and is not signed - much more flexible than what is provided in X12 & UN/EDIFACT. I had some concerns about efficiency, and so undertook a short correspondence with one of the authors, who provided some relief for those concerns. I believe this work will address several XML/EDI security concerns when it is completed and implementations of its capabilities become available. If others concur, I recommend we bring it to the attention of the ebXML team concerned with security (&envleoping & transport). If they like it, we should make use of it in our Technical Architecture model. Cheers, Bob ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- Hi Mark, That's a good answer. I only hope the third party implementors of the specifications will know of this concern up front, and will build this capability into the products they target for use in the XML/EDI marketplace. As we develop our ebXML specifications, I will try to get visibility of these ideas in our technical models. If you have any third party implementors on your team, ou might share these ideas with them also. Thank you for your contributions, Cheers, Bob -----Original Message----- From: Mark Bartel [SMTP:mbartel@JetForm.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2000 9:28 AM To: 'Miller, Robert (GEIS)' Subject: RE: ebXML Technical Architecture Hi Robert, I believe the workgroup answer would be that such issues are outside of our scope. We're trying to provide a small core that can be built upon to provide more complex behaviours. And pragmatically speaking, we're tight on time despite limiting our scope. A few points, however: * implementations can cache resources locally * implementations can cache resource locator/resource digest pairs locally, and therefore bypass calculating the digest on commonly computed values * applications can create assertions and sign them; one such assertion could be "this document validates against this DTD/Schema" Adding these ideas together should allow a low-cost solution. Hope this helps, -Mark -----Original Message----- From: Miller, Robert (GEIS) [mailto:Robert.Miller@geis.ge.com] Sent: Monday, January 10, 2000 5:00 PM To: Mark Bartel Subject: RE: ebXML Technical Architecture Hi Mark Yours was the first reply. I suppose that works, but it sounds too expensive. My assumption is that the Schema/DTD is [very]large compared to the core document, and has been registered and stored in a repository. I would expect that the registration process has computed a digital signature for the Schema/DTD, based on some key other than the key being used by the creator of a the core document. Thousands/millions of documents would be created (by many senders for delivery to many recipients) based upon the same Schema/DTD. Both sender and recipient would likely maintain local copies of the Schema/DTD, and of its associated metadata, including the digital signature for the Schema/DTD as computed by a third party. When a new Schema/DTD is downloaded, full verification of the Schema/DTD signature is appropriate. When a Schema/DTD is referenced in a core document, and a downloaded copy of the Schema/DTD is available, and the Reference DigestValue matches the previously verified Schema/DTD DigestValue metadata value, a frugal sender or recipient would want to omit full verification in day to day operations. As I read the draft XML-Signature document, the sender's key is used to develop the Schema/DTD DigestValue, and full verification of the Schema/DTD is performed for each new document reference to the same Schema/DTD. I think the XML/EDI community needs a less expensive answer than this. Do you have a long answer that's more affordable than your short answer? If not, might your team consider the development of such an answer? Cheers, Bob > -----Original Message----- > From: Mark Bartel [SMTP:mbartel@JetForm.com] > Sent: Monday, January 10, 2000 1:33 PM > To: 'Miller, Robert (GEIS)' > Subject: RE: ebXML Technical Architecture > > Hi Robert, > > Since I'm only back at work today and you sent this email almost a week > ago, > I would assume that your questions have been answered. But I'll give you > the quick answer, just in case, which is that we're assuming that the DTD > or > Schema will be included as a resource in the signature if conformance to > said DTD or Schema is required. So core XML dsig behaviour will verify > the > DTD or Schema, but the application is responsible for ensuring that the > data > signed matches/conforms to the DTD/Schema. > > -Mark Bartel > Senior Software Developer > JetForm Corporation > > -----Original Message----- > From: Miller, Robert (GEIS) [mailto:Robert.Miller@geis.ge.com] > Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2000 5:16 PM > To: mbartel@JetForm.com; jboyer@uwi.com; bfox@Exchange.Microsoft.com > Subject: ebXML Technical Architecture > > Hi folks, > > I chair an ebXML (group formed by UN/CEFACT - OASIS to investigate use of > XML for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) http://www.ebXML.org ) team > which > is charged with defining the ebXML Technical Architecture. One topic of > interest and concern is Electronic Signatures, and I observe that you are > co-authors of a working draft on that topic. > > I quickly scanned the draft, and am pleased with the quality of the work. > I > also Chair the ANSI X12C Subcommittee on Communications and Controls, and > am > a participant in X12C/TG6 Security Task Group which developed the security > envelopes for X12 and helped develop the security envelopes for > UN/EDIFACT. > As I try to relate my EDI environment knowledge to the XML environment in > which I am but a novice, I find myself faced with some security/legal > concerns that simply do not exist in the EDI environment. > > In particular, an EDI document references a published standard, whereas an > XML document references a DTD (or Schema perhaps) that is not published, > and > may be dynamic. If an XML/EDI document were to be signed by an > XML-Signature, my quick read and general intuition says the signature > would > apply to the characters comprising the XML/EDI document, not including any > characters referenced through pointers, as for example the characters > which > make up the DTD (or Schema) when it is included by reference. > > If faced with a legal challenge regarding the semantic intent of a > received > XML/EDI document, the XML-Signature can provide assurance that the signed > information was unchanged and authorized. But the semantic meaning of the > information is defined by the metadata in the (unverifiable) DTD. > > It would seem that the solution would be to glean the signature/hash from > a > signed DTD and include that signature/hash in the XML/EDI document, so > that > the parties could verify that the DTD referenced by the originator was in > fact the DTD referenced by the recipient. I expect that a recipient would > want verification that the included signature/hash matched the > signature/hash of the included content. Of course, this could be > accomplished outside XML-Security, but it seems to me that it should be a > 'built-in' feature of XML-Security. > > How would your team propose that the capability I've described above be > provided, given the XML-Signature capabilities defined in your draft > document? Is > this problem of interest to you, or is the problem in our court to > address? > > Thank you, > > Bob Miller > 615-371-6037 Bob Miller 615-371-6037
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